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Abstract: 
This paper studies WIC eligibility and participation. These outcomes are related to economic 
conditions, Medicaid, cash welfare, and WIC policies, and demographic characteristics. The 
analysis uses state level data from 1983 to 2006, a period that covers significant expansion in the 
Medicaid program, the transition from AFDC to TANF, and significant changes in economic 
conditions. The results show that take-up has increased more than eligibility over this time 
period. Separating eligibility and participation is important because a number of state 
characteristics have opposite effects on these outcomes. Economic conditions, the Medicaid 
expansions, and immigration in the post-TANF period are shown to be associated with WIC 
eligibility and participation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) provides 
recipients with food vouchers, nutritional counseling, and referrals to health-care providers. 
Between 1980 and 2008 the number of recipients increased 355 percent, from 1.9 million to 8.7 
million individuals. Over this same period, significant changes to the Medicaid program, as well 
as changes to the WIC program itself, increased access to WIC. Consequently, the increase in 
recipients may result from the increase in the number of eligible individuals alone (i.e., with no 
change in take-up behavior conditional on eligibility) or in combination with changes in take-up 
behavior. 
 
Considering both eligibility and take-up is important because the number of recipients depends 
on both. Furthermore, changing policies, economic conditions, and demographics may affect 
eligibility and take-up differently. For example, an increase in unemployment will increase the 
number of individuals eligible for WIC, but it will also lower the take-up rate if the newly 
eligible individuals have a lower take-up rate than previously eligible individuals. Consequently, 
to understand the full effects of a change in the environment, eligibility and take-up must both be 
considered. 
 
Additionally, the number of recipients may not immediately adjust to a change in conditions. In 
the case of an increase in unemployment, an initial reduction in take-up may be offset by 
increases in subsequent periods if the takeup rate among newly eligible individuals increases 
over time or if the worsened economic conditions result in increased recipiency by those 
previously eligible. Whether the total effect is positive or negative is then an empirical question. 
 
WIC eligibility and take-up may also depend on the policies of other assistance programs 
because recipients of a number of programs (e.g., Medicaid, food stamps, AFDC/TANF) are 
automatically income eligible for WIC. Thus it is important to include policy changes such as the 
Medicaid expansions of the 1980s and the Personal Work Opportunity and Responsibility Act of 
1996, which replaced AFDC with TANF, in the analysis. The Medicaid expansions are 
especially important because the major expansions in eligibility occurred during the same time 
period that the number of WIC recipients increased. 
 
Understanding how policies, economic conditions, and demographic characteristics affect 
eligibility for and receipt of WIC is important for a number of reasons. First, a number of studies 
suggest that WIC participation improves recipients’ health outcomes. For example, Devaney et 
al. (1992), Gordon and Nelson (1995), Brien and Swann (2001), Kowaleski-Jones and Duncan 
(2002), Bitler and Currie (2005), and Figlio, Hamersma, and Roth (2009) found prenatal WIC 
participation improves birth outcomes while Carlson and Senauer (2003) found improvements in 
child health.1 
 
Second, there is evidence that these health improvements may generate cost savings for 
Medicaid that offset the cost of WIC. Devaney et al. (1992) and Buescher, et al. (1993) 
concluded that improvements in infant health result in savings to the Medicaid program that 
outweigh the costs of WIC, and GAO (1992) found that WIC generates substantial saving in 
health costs to the Medicaid program, state and local governments, and private insurers through 
age 18. 
 
Third, the expansion of WIC eligibility, largely through expanded Medicaid eligibility and 
automatic WIC eligibility for Medicaid recipients, has increased the amount of income a family 
can earn and be eligible (Besharov and McCall 2009). To the extent that health benefits may be 
most likely to be realized by the neediest recipients, higher income eligibility will result in 
smaller average health benefits and thus smaller reductions in Medicaid costs. This in turn may 
alter the cost benefit calculations from the Devaney et al (1992) and Buescher et al. (1993) 
studies which relied on data gathered before the Medicaid expansions were fully phased in 
(1987-1988). 
 
Finally, there is the reach of the program. Although not as large as food stamps or Medicaid in 
dollar value, over 50 percent of infants and pregnant women are estimated to be eligible for 
WIC. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to better understand the relationship between eligibility and receipt 
of WIC on the one hand and state-level policies, economic conditions, and demographic 
characteristics on the other. The analysis uses state level data for the period 1983 to 2006 and 
allows for delayed adjustment to changing economic conditions and policies. The time period is 
important because there were significant changes in the Medicaid and AFDC/TANF programs 
during this period. Additionally, the study period covers multiple business cycles allowing for a 
more complete understanding of the role played by economic conditions. To the extent that there 
are significant relationships among these variables, it may be possible to design policies to 
increase take-up among eligible individuals, to increase or decrease the number of individuals 
who are eligible, or to anticipate future demands on the program that result from changing 
societal trends or economic conditions. 
 
The results show that the per capita eligibility rate increased at the time of the Medicaid 
expansions but that increases in the take-up rate are larger than increases in eligibility over the 
1983 to 2006 time period. The unemployment rate and the income threshold for Medicaid 
eligibility are found to be positively related to per capita eligibility, but negatively related to 
current period take-up rate. The model also allows for eligibility and participation to sluggishly 
adjust to changes in economic conditions, and increases in the unemployment rate are shown to 
positively affect take-up with a delay. Finally, immigration in the post-TANF period is 
associated with increases in the WIC take-up rate suggesting substitution between programs. 
 
BACKGROUND ON THE WIC PROGRAM 
 
The WIC program began as a pilot program in 1972 and became a national program in 1974. It is 
administered as a partnership among the Federal government, 88 state-level agencies, and 1,885 
local agencies.2 The Federal government provides annual funding, issues regulations regarding 
eligibility and administration of the program, and monitors compliance with those regulations. 
The state agencies administer the program at the state level or though local agencies, typically at 
the county level. The state agencies distribute funds to the local agencies, set rules not dictated 
by the Federal government, and monitor compliance with those rules. The local agencies work 
with WIC clinics. The clinics, which may be located in a number of settings such as county 
departments of public health, hospitals, or mobile vans, are the point of contact for applicants 
and recipients. 
 
Over the history of the program, the Federal government has exercised increasing control over 
program administration. Until the late 1980s, states had significant discretion in determining 
eligibility for the program. For example, states had the option of automatically making Medicaid, 
AFDC, and food stamp recipients income eligible until the Child Nutrition and WIC 
Reauthorization Act of 1989 mandated that these groups be deemed income eligible. Similarly, 
states were allowed to set their own standards regarding the income documentation required to 
determine eligibility until October 1989 when the Federal government required states to collect 
documentation. 
In spite of the standardization of WIC rules, the general eligibility requirements have been 
constant over time. In order to participate, an individual must meet three requirements. First, 
only certain groups are eligible: infants; children younger than five years old; and pregnant, 
postpartum and breastfeeding women. Second, recipients must be at “nutritional risk”. The 
criteria for judging risk vary by group. For example, nutritional risk criteria for pregnant women 
include anemia, being overweight, smoking, drug or alcohol use, or past history of poor birth 
outcomes while criteria for infants include anemia, failure to thrive, or low birth weight. Finally, 
WIC is a means-tested program, and individuals may be income eligible in one of two ways. 
They must either live in a family whose income is less than 185 percent of the poverty threshold 
or be adjunctively eligible as a result of participation in another program. 
 
WIC participants receive nutritional and behavioral counseling, health care referrals, and 
vouchers for nutritious food. The specific bundle of foods and services depends on the 
individual’s age and specific nutritional needs. For example, infants may receive formula, infant 
cereal, and juice while young children may receive milk, eggs, cereal, juice, and beans. The 
value of the average food bundle is relatively modest. In nominal terms, per recipient spending 
on food has averaged about $30 over the history of the program. Unlike AFDC/TANF and food 
stamps, there is no benefit formula, and average benefits per month are calculated by dividing 
expenditures by person-months. 
 
Figure 1 presents trends in the number of recipients. WIC has grown from 2.5 million recipients 
in 1983 to about 8 million recipients in 2006. The top line in Figure 1 shows the number of total 
recipients over the study period (1983 to 2006). The remaining lines in Figure 1 show that 
children make up the largest group of recipients. 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of Recipients 
 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
Although not as extensive as the literature studying the effect of WIC on birth outcomes, there 
are a number of studies of WIC participation. Brien and Swann (2001) estimated a linear 
probability model of participation among eligible pregnant women in 1988, but their measure of 
eligibility was very crude. Bitler and Currie (2005) studied Medicaid-eligible women and 
estimated a logit model of participation for the period 1992-1999. Bitler, Currie, and Scholz 
(2003) focused specifically on eligibility and participation. They used individual level data from 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation to construct estimates of eligibility and take-up 
at the national level for 1998 and to examine the correlates of participation by eligible 
individuals in 1998. They also used individual-level CPS data from 1997-2000 and state-level 
administrative data for the period 1992-2000 to study the take-up rate in the population (not 
accounting for eligibility).3 
 
Bitler, Currie, and Scholz (2003) and Bitler and Currie (2005) include the income threshold for 
Medicaid eligibility in their analyses, but their data do not cover the period of most significant 
expansion of Medicaid eligibility. Additionally, none of these studies covers a complete business 
cycle. Bitler, Currie, and Scholz (2003) suggest this may be the reason they find little 
relationship between WIC recipients and economic conditions. Finally, none of these studies 
models both eligibility and take-up. The present paper seeks to fill these gaps. 
 
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
 
The analysis is performed at the state level and considers three measures of the WIC program: 1) 
WIC recipients per 1,000 population (the population participation rate), 2) eligible individuals 
per 1,000 population (the eligibility rate), and 3) recipients per 1,000 eligible individuals (the 
take-up rate). Rates are used to account for large differences in state populations. State-level data 
are used because individual level data are only available for recent years and do not cover the 
full expansion of the Medicaid program. Moreover, it can be difficult to determine eligibility for 
pregnant and breastfeeding women at the individual level. 
 
The outcome variables are assumed to depend on a state’s economic conditions, policy 
environment, and demographic characteristics.4 Economic conditions affect the number of 
individuals who are eligible and the number who choose to receive benefits. Non-WIC policies 
affect the number of people eligible for WIC through their effect on Medicaid and TANF 
participation. Additionally, non-WIC policies may affect take-up of WIC among eligible 
individuals if, for example, these policies (e.g., TANF) are perceived as punitive and discourage 
individuals from applying for benefits more generally. Finally, some of the analysis includes 
WIC variables that are expected to affect both eligibility and take-up.5 
 
The full response of take-up to a change in economic conditions or policy may not be felt 
immediately (Ziliak, et al. 2000; Blank 2001). Consider an increase in the income threshold for 
Medicaid. Because it affects WIC eligibility through its effect on Medicaid participation, the 
effect of a change may be felt immediately, or it may be felt with some delay if it takes time for 
individuals to become aware of their eligibility for Medicaid and to participate.6 The effect on 
take-up may also change over time. When the income threshold increases, we can think of 
eligible individuals as being either originally eligible or newly eligible. If the take-up rate among 
newly eligible individuals is lower than the take-up rate for those who were previously eligible, 
then the take-up rate will fall. This could happen if newly eligible individuals are not aware of 
their eligibility or if they believe they do not need the benefits. In subsequent periods, the take-up 
rate will rise as some of the newly eligible do choose to take up benefits, and the full effect may 
be positive or negative. Such dynamic effects are also likely to exist for changes in economic 
conditions. Consequently, the model includes lags of the unemployment rate and the income 
eligibility threshold for Medicaid.7 
 
This example also highlights the fact that a policy change such as the expansion of Medicaid 
discussion may have different effects on eligibility and take-up. In the above example, it is 
possible that increasing the income threshold increases the eligibility rate and decreases the take-
up rate, and an analysis of only the population take-up rate might conclude that there is no effect 
of expansions in Medicaid eligibility on WIC participation. From a policy perspective, however, 
it would be helpful to know the offsetting effects on eligibility and participation. 
 
The empirical analysis uses a fixed-effects regression model.8 This model relates the measures of 
WIC eligibility and receipt to state-level economic conditions, policies, and demographic 
characteristics. The model also includes a full complement of state effects, year effects, and 
state-specific time trends. The model is 
 
 
where i indexes states, t indexes time, yit is a measure of WIC eligibility or participation, Xit p is 
a vector of variables measuring state i’s policies at time t, Xit e is a vector of measures of state i’s 
economic conditions at time t, Xit d is a vector of variables measuring demographic 
characteristics of state i at time t. The parameter λt is a time period specific disturbance, α i is a 
state specific disturbance, τ i measures a state-specific time trend, and ε it is a random 
disturbance that is, conditional on αi , τi , and λt , assumed to be independent over states and time 
periods.9 The estimates are weighted by the number of individuals infants, children, and pregnant 
and postpartum breastfeeding women in each state in each year. The tables below report Huber-
White robust standard errors. 
 
DATA 
 
The empirical analysis uses state level data on the WIC program, economic conditions, WIC, 
Medicaid, and AFDC/TANF policies, and demographic characteristics. Data sources are 
described in Appendix Table 1, and descriptive statistics for the variables described below are 
given in Appendix Table 2. The remainder of this section describes key groups of variables. 
 
WIC ELIGIBILITY AND RECEIPT 
 
The dependent variables for the analysis are the population participation rate, the eligibility rate, 
and the take-up rate. These are constructed separately for all recipients and for women, infants, 
and children. As an example, consider infants. The population participation rate is the number of 
infant recipients divided by the number of infants (eligible or not) in the population; the 
eligibility rate is the number of eligible infants divided by the number of infants in the 
population; and the take-up rate is the number of infant recipients divided by the number of 
eligible infants. 
 
Administrative data are available for the number of total recipients and separately for the number 
of women, infants, and children. Data are not readily available on the number of WIC eligible 
individuals. However, for budgeting and forecasting purposes, the USDA developed a 
methodology to estimate the number of eligible women, infants, and children. The original 
methodology produced estimated take-up rates of over 100 percent for some groups (National 
Research Council 2003) which suggested that the USDA was underestimating eligibility. As a 
result, the USDA asked the National Academy of Sciences to study the measurement of WIC 
eligibility. In 2003, the National Research Council (NRC) at the National Academy of Sciences 
published a monograph describing several issues with the USDA methodology and 
recommending changes to it. 
 
Like the original methodology, the NRC-recommended methodology uses CPS data to estimate 
the number of infants and children and then uses the estimated number of infants to calculate the 
number of eligible pregnant and postpartum women. Unlike the original method, the estimates 
are adjusted to account for the undercount of infants in the CPS and for the use of annual income 
in the CPS (WIC eligibility is based on monthly income); individuals receiving Medicaid, Food 
Stamps, or cash welfare are considered WIC-eligible; and no adjustment is made for nutritional 
risk.10 Taken together, these changes have the effect of increasing the number of individuals who 
are estimated to be eligible for WIC (NRC 2003, Besharov and McCall 2009). For example, 
under the original methodology 1.5 million infants were estimated to be eligible in 1999, and this 
number rose to 2.2 million under the new methodology (NRC 2003).11 
 
The NRC methodology is used to construct estimates of the number of WIC eligible women, 
infants, and children in each state for the time period 1983 to 2006, and these estimates are used 
to construct the population participation rate, the eligibility rate, and the take-up rate.12 The 
calculation of the number of individuals depends on the number of eligible infants, and there are 
relatively few eligible infants in some state-year combinations.13 These smaller sample sizes 
increase the likelihood of measurement error in the number of eligible individuals. Because 
eligibility appears as the dependent variable, measurement error increases the standard error of 
the estimated coefficients but should not bias the parameter estimates (Wooldridge 2002). 
 
Figures 2, 3, and 4 present trends in the population participation rate, the eligibility rate, and the 
take-up rate, respectively. Each graph shows the trend for all recipients and separately for 
women, infants, and children. Figure 2 shows the participation rates are generally similar in 
shape to the trends in recipients. Infants have a notably high participation rate while children 
have the lowest participation rate. Figure 3 shows that, consistent with the timing of the 
Medicaid expansions, there an increase in the late 1980s and early 1990s. There is also a drop in 
eligibility around the introduction of the TANF program. Infants are most likely to be eligible, 
but the difference in eligibility is much smaller than the difference in the population participation 
rate shown in Figure 2. Finally, Figure 4 shows that take-up rates are significantly higher for 
infants than for other groups, and, as with the population participation rate, children have the 
lowest take-up rate. The key result to emerge from the analysis of trends is that the overall 
increase in recipients appears to result from an increase participation conditional on eligibility 
rather than changes in eligibility itself. 
 
The NRC methodology can also be used to estimate the number of individuals who are income 
eligible and the number of individuals who are not income eligible but are adjunctively eligible. 
In Figure 5 the “income eligible” line is the number of individuals who live in families with 
income less than 185% of poverty while the “adjunctively (but not income) eligible” line gives 
the number of individuals who are not income eligible but who are eligible by virtue of the fact 
that they receive Medicaid, food stamps, or cash welfare.14 The number of people who are 
adjunctively eligible prior to 1989 is not 0 because some states made recipients of other 
programs eligible prior to the Federal mandate. Information about this policy is first available in 
1988, and the figure assumes that states did not change their policies between 1983 and 1988.15
 
Figure 2: Population Participation Rate 
 
Figure 3: Eligibility Rates 
Figure 4: Take-up Rates 
 
Figure 5: Type of Eligibility 
The number of individuals who are adjunctively (though not income) eligible shows an increase 
between 1989 and 1996, consistent with the Federal rule change mandating adjunctive eligibility 
for Medicaid, AFDC/TANF, and food stamp recipients. The decline around 1996 is likely the 
result of passage and implementation of TANF. In contrast, the number of individuals who are 
income eligible generally follows the business cycle. 
 
ECONOMIC VARIABLES 
 
Because WIC is means-tested, the number of eligible individuals will depend on economic 
conditions in the state. Following the studies of welfare caseloads (e.g., CEA 1997), economic 
conditions are primarily parameterized by the unemployment rate. As discussed above, the 
number of eligible individuals or recipients may not adjust immediately. Consequently, the 
model includes the current period unemployment rate and three lags.16 The analysis also 
controls for the growth rate in employment to account for changing job opportunities that may 
not be captured by the unemployment rate. 
 
MEDICAID AND CASH WELFARE VARIABLES 
 
Because of adjunctive eligibility for Medicaid and cash welfare recipients, the analysis includes 
variables measuring a number of aspects of these programs. The Medicaid expansions of the 
1980s broke the link between AFDC and Medicaid and, over time, made higher income women 
and children Medicaid eligible.17,18 The expansion in eligibility is parameterized by the income 
threshold for Medicaid eligibility for a pregnant woman (e.g., 100 percent of poverty, 185 
percent of poverty and so on). Prior to the expansions, eligibility for Medicaid was tied to AFDC 
participation, and the AFDC income threshold determined Medicaid eligibility. The 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 extended coverage to all pregnant 
women who were income-eligible for AFDC regardless of participation. Thereafter, the 
threshold was determined either by the federal mandate or by the expansion of coverage offered 
by states.19 For the years prior to the Medicaid expansions, the cutoff is assumed to be the 
percentage of the poverty threshold associated with the AFDC need standard for a family of 
three. The income threshold is expected to have a direct effect on eligibility through adjunctive 
eligibility for Medicaid recipients. It may have an indirect effect on take-up if increasing income 
eligibility changes the eligible population in ways that reduce take-up (e.g., higher income 
individuals made eligible through the expansions are less likely to know they are eligible). 
 
In addition to changes in Medicaid, there have also been significant changes in the provision of 
cash welfare during the history of the WIC program, and a number of variables are included to 
capture these changes. The monthly real benefit level for a family of three measures both 
eligibility (a higher guarantee increases break-even income making more people eligible) and 
financial generosity which affects take-up. 
 
During the early to mid 1990s, many states received waivers to AFDC program rules. These 
waivers included policies such as time limits, enhanced work requirements, and increased 
sanctions for non-compliance with rules. The analysis includes a variable indicating whether a 
“major” waiver was in place. A major waiver must cover a significant portion of the state 
population and include at least one of six types of policies as described by CEA (1997). 
Similarly, a variable that measures the implementation of the TANF program is included in the 
analysis. In the year of implementation, the variable indicates the fraction of the year in which 
the waiver (or TANF) is in effect. In all cases, implementation dates rather than approval dates 
are used. 
 
TANF had particularly significant implications for immigrants as most immigrants were made 
ineligible for benefits. To allow for this, a measure of immigration (newly admitted immigrants 
as a percentage of the state’s TANF ⋅ (immigrants − μimm ) where TANF is the TANF variable, 
immigrants is the percentage of immigrants, and μimm is the average percentage of immigrants. 
With this specification, the coefficient on the non-interacted TANF variable measures the effect 
of TANF when immigrants are evaluated at μimm (Wooldridge 2009). 
TANF policies (or AFDC waivers) are not likely to affect the number of individuals eligible for 
WIC because most individuals who receive welfare are income eligible. However, the effect on 
take-up is ambiguous. Individuals who exit welfare may seek out benefits from WIC to off-set 
lost welfare benefits, or they may choose not apply for assistance because they may assume that 
they are not eligible for other assistance programs. 
 
WIC PROGRAM VARIABLES 
 
Ideally the analysis would include a full array of WIC program variables. Unfortunately, 
variables describing WIC program rules are only available for a limited number of years. 
Information about policies comes from WIC Program and Participant Characteristics surveys. 
These began in 1988 and have been conducted every two years (with the exception of 1990). 
Because information on the policies is not available for all years, variables describing the WIC 
program are only included in a subset of the analysis. 
 
Three WIC policies are considered. First, as noted above, prior to 1989 states had the option to 
make recipients of other assistance programs income eligible for WIC. In November 1989 the 
Federal government mandated that Medicaid recipients be automatically income eligible for 
WIC benefits.20 This mandate affected 22 states that did not already make Medicaid recipients 
income eligible for WIC benefits. Second, in 1998 states were required to collect income 
documentation for WIC applicants. At the time of implementation, 10 states did not require such 
documentation. Finally, as of April 1999 the Federal government standardized the nutritional risk 
criteria. Prior to this, each state set its own eligibility cutoffs, and the analysis includes the 
hemoglobin cutoff for a pregnant woman in her first trimester. 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
 
The analysis also includes variables describing the demographic make-up of the state. Changes 
in the demographic composition of a state over time may be important determinants of caseloads 
even after controlling for economic conditions and policies. The variables included are the 
percentage of a state’s population who are newly admitted immigrants (described above), the 
percentage of adults with less than a high school degree, the percentage with a high school 
degree (the percentage of the state’s population with more than a high school degree is the 
reference group), the percentage of the state’s population that is black, the percentage that is 
Hispanic, the percentage that is of another race (non-Hispanic white is the reference group), and 
the percentage of children living in families with no father present. These variables are 
calculated from the March CPS. 
 
RESULTS 
 
RESULTS FOR ALL RECIPIENTS 
 
The analysis begins by examining (the logarithm of) total recipients per 1000 population (the 
population participation rate) where “population” means the number of pregnant women, 
postpartum women, infants, and children up to age 5. The results are presented in the first 
column of Table 1. The table (and all subsequent tables) reports coefficients multiplied by 100 so 
the table entries are interpreted as the percent change in the dependent variable associated with a 
one unit change in the explanatory variable. 
 
The estimates suggest little relationship between the population participation rate and assistance 
policies. The exception is the implementation of TANF which is associated with a 9.8 percent 
reduction in the recipients per 1000 population. However, the results also suggest that post-
TANF increases in the percentage of new immigrants increase the population participation rate. 
Specifically, a one tenth of one percentage point increase in new immigrants (recall that the 
mean is 0.35) is estimated to increase the population participation rate by 2.1 percent. The 
population participation rate does not statistically depend on current unemployment, but it is 
positively associated with unemployment in periods t-2 and t-3. This suggests that there is 
delayed adjustment to increases in unemployment. Over a four year period, a one percentage 
point increase in unemployment is estimated to increase the population participation rate by 3.6 
percent (F-stat 36.87, p-value 0.00). 
 
Table 1: All Recipients – Basic Models 
Variable   Recipients/Population   Eligibles/Population   Recipients/Eligibles 
Policy Variables 
Medicaid Income 
Cutoff 
 -0.005(0.027) 0.065**(0.026) -0.069*(0.036) 
Medicaid Income 
Cutoff t-1  
0.022(0.026) -0.009(0.027) 0.032(0.037) 
Welfare Benefit Level 
for Family of 3  
0.003(0.013) 0.0004(0.012) 0.003(0.018) 
Major Waiver to AFDC 
Rules  
-2.682(2.414) 1.111(2.366) -3.793(3.425) 
TANF Program  -9.763*(5.663) -2.237(5.684) -7.526(4.841) 
TANF * Percent New 
Immigrants  
20.904**(7.423) -1.322(6.016) 22.226**(9.928) 
Economic Variables 
Unemployment rate  0.096(0.486) 1.608**(0.437) -1.512**(0.677) 
Unemployment rate t-1  0.392(0.509) 0.451(0.452) -0.059(0.712) 
Unemployment rate t-2  1.254**(0.461) -0.072(0.417) 1.327**(0.630) 
Unemployment rate t-3  1.878**(0.426) 0.764**(0.376) 1.111*(0.583) 
Demographic Variables 
Percent New 
Immigrants  
-5.505*(2.864) -0.497(2.071) -4.548(3.972) 
Percent Kids Not 
Living With Father  
0.088(0.111) 0.218**(0.104) -0.131(0.154) 
Percent Black  -0.560(0.366) 0.274(0.374) -0.835(0.535) 
Percent Hispanic  -0.163(0.473) 0.506(0.400) -0.669(0.604) 
Percent Other 
Race/Ethnicity  
-0.412(0.548) -0.350(0.541) -0.062(0.764) 
Percent < HS  0.235(0.380) 0.822**(0.331) -0.587(0.522) 
Percent with HS  -0.158(0.337) 0.910**(0.305) -1.068**(0.469) 
Notes: Sample size is 1165. All models include the employment growth rate, state effects, year 
effects, and state time trends. Table entries are coefficient estimates multiplied by 100. Percent 
white and percent with more than a HS education are the base categories for race/ethnicity and 
education, respectively. Robust standard are in parentheses. * denotes p ≤ 0.1. ** denotes p ≤ 
0.05. 
 
The second and third columns present results with the (logarithm of the) eligibility and take-up 
rates as the dependent variables. The current period Medicaid income threshold is positively 
related to the eligibility rate with an increase of 10 percentage points in the income cutoff for 
Medicaid estimated to increase the eligibility rate by 0.65 percent. Over the course of two years 
this effect is estimated to be a statistically significant 0.55 percent (F-Stat 4.25, pvalue 
0.04). 
At the same time, the last column shows a negative relationship between the take-up rate and the 
current period Medicaid income threshold. This result is consistent with lower take-up by newly 
eligible individuals when compared to individuals who were WIC-eligible prior to the increase in 
Medicaid eligibility. The take-up rate rises in the second period (t-1), although the effect is not 
statistically significant, and the coefficients are not jointly statistically significant (F-stat 0.92, p-
value 0.34). These results suggest only weak evidence that the newly eligible increase their 
participation in WIC after one year of eligibility. They are consistent with Blank and Ruggles 
(1996) who find that most AFDC and food stamp eligibility spells end without participation 
(which would lower the take-up rate) and that most individuals who will participate do so early 
in their eligibility (which means take-up would not be expected to rise significantly over time). 
 
Taken together, these results show how offsetting eligibility and take-up estimates can obscure 
potentially important relationships when they are combined into the population participation rate. 
In the case of Medicaid, the 0.65 percent increase in eligibility resulting from a 10 percentage 
point increase in the Medicaid income threshold is almost exactly offset by a 0.69 percent 
decrease in take-up. 
 
Similar results are found for an increase in the current period unemployment rate. However, 
unlike Medicaid, where there are no dynamic effects, over four years an increase in the 
unemployment rate is associated with an increase in the population participation rate even 
though the initial effects on eligibility and take-up offset each other. Over the course of four 
years, a one percentage point increase in unemployment is estimated to increase the population 
participation rate by 3.6 percent (F-stat 36.87, p-value 0.00). 
 
This 3.6 percent increase over four years results from a 2.8 percent increase in eligibility (F-Stat 
34.64, p-value 0.00) and a 0.9 percent increase in take-up (F-stat 1.45 p-value 0.23). Similar to 
the result for Medicaid eligibility, increased unemployment initially reduces the take-up rate. 
However, take-up in period t is positively related to unemployment in periods t-2 and t-3. This is 
consistent with learning about benefits and/or with longer-term need in periods of high 
unemployment. 
 
TYPE OF ELIGIBILITY 
 
As discussed above, an individual is eligible for WIC when her income is less than 185 percent 
of poverty or when she participates in Medicaid, Food Stamps, or AFDC/TANF. In the same 
way the population participation rate was broken into the eligibility rate and take-up rate, the 
results in Table 2 decompose the eligibility rate into income and adjunctive eligibility. Higher 
unemployment rates, lower education, and higher current period Medicaid eligibility thresholds 
are positively associated with the income eligibility rate. Higher welfare benefits are estimated to 
increase the adjunctive eligibility rate. Somewhat surprisingly, higher Medicaid eligibility does 
not affect the adjunctive eligibility rate. 
 
ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS 
 
Tables 3 and 4 explore the sensitivity of the results for eligibility and take-up, respectively, to a 
number of changes in the specification. The first column of each table reproduces the results 
from Table 1. Ziliak, et al. (2000) raise the issue of non-stationarity in a model of monthly 
AFDC caseloads and consider dynamic specifications. Although this is less likely to be an issue 
with annual data, the second column of each table includes the lagged value of the dependent 
variable as an independent variable.21 For both outcomes, there is evidence of autocorrelation in 
eligibility and take-up, but there is no evidence of nonstationarity or of substantial changes in the 
other estimates. 
 
The third column includes measures of Medicaid, Food Stamp and cash welfare recipients. These 
variables are meant to more directly control for adjunctive eligibility. Their inclusion does not 
substantially alter the conclusions from the base case for the eligibility rate. For take-up, 
including other program recipients increases the estimated effect of TANF (in absolute value) 
and reduces the estimated effect of immigrants during the post-TANF period. The basic 
Medicaid and income results are unaffected. 
 
Table 2: Type of Eligibility 
Variable Eligibles/Population Inc. 
Elig./Population 
Adj. 
Elig./Population 
Policy Variables 
Medicaid Income 
Cutoff  
0.065**(0.026) 0.062**(0.030) -0.162(0.219) 
Medicaid Income 
Cutoff t-1  
-0.009(0.027) -0.026(0.028) 0.086(0.191) 
Monthly Welfare 
Benefit Level for 
Family  
0.0004(0.012) -0.004(0.014) 0.190**(0.087) 
Major Waiver to 
AFDC Rules  
1.111(2.366) -0.641(2.614) 14.595(11.753) 
TANF Program  -2.237(5.684) -4.548(5.959) 22.544(15.317) 
TANF * Percent 
New Immigrants  
-1.322(6.016) -2.400(6.603) 13.633(27.008) 
Economic Variables 
Unemployment 
rate  
1.608**(0.437) 1.901**(0.487) -3.115(3.008) 
Unemployment 
rate t-1  
0.451(0.452) 0.757(0.505) -3.323(3.046) 
Unemployment 
rate t-2  
-0.072(0.417) -0.090(0.472) 0.704(2.664) 
Unemployment 
rate t-3  
0.764**(0.376) 0.714*(0.414) -1.108(2.783) 
Demographic Variables 
Percent New 
Immigrants  
-0.497(2.071) -3.038(2.245) -8.137(15.736) 
Percent Kids Not 
Living with Father  
0.218**(0.104) 0.228(0.112) -0.376(0.795) 
Percent Black  0.274(0.374) 0.574(0.398) -1.589(2.263) 
Percent Hispanic  0.506(0.400) 0.563(0.437) -0.500(2.628) 
Percent Other 
Race/Ethnicity 
 -0.350(0.541) -0.213(0.609) -6.694(2.263) 
Percent < HS  0.822**(0.331) 0.804**(0.367) 1.973(2.765) 
Percent with HS  0.910**(0.305) 0.965**(0.336) 0.427(2.026) 
Sample Size  1165  1165  1026 
Notes: All models include the employment growth rate, state effects, year effects, and state time 
trends. Table entries are coefficient estimates multiplied by 100. Percent white and percent with 
more than a HS education are the base categories for race/ethnicity and education, respectively. 
Robust standard are in parentheses. *denotes p ≤ 0.1. ** denotes p ≤ 0.05. 
 
Table 3: Alternative Specifications for Eligibility 
Variable  Base Model Lagged 
Dependent 
Variable 
Other 
Program 
Recipients 
Infant Take-
up Rate < 
1000 
No 
Adjustment to 
CPS Weights 
Policy Variables 
Medicaid 
Income Cutoff  
0.065**(0.026) 0.063**(0.026) 0.063**(0.023) 0.043*(0.024) 0.064**(0.026) 
Medicaid 
Income Cutoff 
t-1  
-0.009(0.027) -0.013(0.026) -0.014(0.025) 0.005(0.024) -0.001(0.026) 
Welfare 
Benefit Level 
for Family of 3  
0.0004(0.012) 0.002(0.012) -0.008(0.011) 0.0010(0.011) 0.0001(0.012) 
TANF Program  -2.237(5.684) -2.692(5.735) -0.045(5.717) 0.531(6.820) -2.282(5.658) 
TANF * 
Percent New 
Immigrants  
-1.322(6.016) -1.929(5.996) -0.379(5.747) -1.184(5.920) -1.335(5.998) 
Lagged 
Dependent 
Variable 
 -----  9.424**(4.002) -----  -----  ----- 
Medicaid 
Recipients 
/1000 Pop. 
 -----  -----  0.013**(0.003) -----  ----- 
Food Stamps  -----  -----  0.003(0.003) -----  ----- 
Recip. / 1000 
Pop. 
AFDC/TANF 
Recip. / 1000 
Pop. 
 -----  -----  0.120**(0.023) -----  ----- 
Economic Variables 
Unemployment 
rate  
1.608**(0.437) 1.641**(0.438) 1.181**(0.410) 1.545**(0.424) 1.592**(0.436) 
Unemployment 
rate t-1  
0.451(0.452) 0.288(0.455) 0.257(0.408) 0.718(0.441) 0.466(0.452) 
Unemployment 
rate t-2  
-0.072(0.417) -0.110(0.417) -0.351(0.385) -0.071(0.403) -0.076(0.416) 
Unemployment 
rate t-3  
0.764**(0.376) 0.718*(0.373) 0.451(0.351) 0.648*(0.373) 0.744**(0.375) 
Demographic Variables 
Percent New 
Immigrants  
-0.497(2.071) -0.637(2.080) 1.008(2.088) 0.423(2.063) -0.513(2.108) 
Sample Size  1165  1165  1165  1015  1160 
Notes: All models include the employment growth rate, state effects, year effects, and state time 
trends. Table entries are coefficient estimates multiplied by 100. Percent white and percent with 
more than a HS education are the base categories for race/ethnicity and education, respectively. 
Robust standard are in parentheses. *denotes p ≤ 0.1. ** denotes p ≤ 0.05. 
 
Table 4: Alternative Specifications for Take-up 
Variable  Base Model Lagged 
Dependent 
Variable 
Other 
Program 
Recipients 
 Infant Take-
up Rate < 1000 
 No 
Adjustment to 
CPS Weights 
Policy Variables 
Medicaid 
Income 
Cutoff  
-0.069*(0.036) -
0.081**(0.034) 
-0.062*(0.023) -0.036(0.037) -0.068*(0.036) 
Medicaid 
Income 
Cutoff t-1  
0.032(0.037) 0.050(0.035) 0.029(0.038) 0.001(0.037) 0.032(0.037) 
Welfare 
Benefit Level 
for Family of 
3  
0.003(0.018) -0.009(0.017) -0.002(0.018) -0.013(0.018) 0.004(0.018) 
TANF 
Program  
-7.526(4.841) -4.129(4.878) -
10.496**(4.90
0) 
-
11.107**(4.964) 
-7.292(4.805) 
TANF * 
Percent New 
Immigrants 
 
22.226**(9.92
8) 
14.038(9.629) 9.956(9.709) 21.904**(10.36
4) 
22.099**(9.89
7) 
Lagged 
Dependent 
Variable  
-----  24.445**(3.33
1) 
-----  -----  ----- 
Medicaid 
Recipients 
/1000 Pop. 
 -----  -----  0.011**(0.001) -----  ----- 
Food Stamps 
Recip. / 1000 
Pop. 
 -----  -----  0.014**(0.001) -----  ----- 
AFDC/TANF 
Recip. / 1000 
Pop. 
 -----  -----  -
0.290**(0.035) 
-----  ----- 
Economic Variables 
Unemployme
nt rate  
-
1.512**(0.677) 
-
1.633**(0.661) 
-1.276*(0.656) -1.322**(0.657) -
1.495**(0.675) 
Unemployme
nt rate t-1  
-0.059(0.712) 0.247(0.682) 0.325(0.670) -0.331(0.695) -0.081(0.711) 
Unemployme
nt rate t-2  
1.327**(0.630) 1.324(0.616) 1.071*(0.599) 1.392**(0.600) 1.331**(0.627) 
Unemployme
nt rate t-3 
 1.111*(0.583) 0.809(0.551) 1.264**(0.562) 0.132**(0.571) 1.138**(0.580) 
Demographic Variables 
Percent New 
Immigrants  
-4.548(3.972) -1.938(4.136) -5.896(3.655) -4.769(3.992) -4.586(4.021) 
Sample Size  1165  1165  1165  1015  1160 
Notes: Table entries are estimated coefficients multiplied by 100. All models include state 
effects, year effects, state time trends, and additional demographic controls as described in Table 
1. Robust standard are in parentheses. * denotes p ≤ 0.1. ** denotes p ≤ 0.05. 
The sample size is 1160 rather than 1165 in the last column because, as described in footnote 12, 
observations with infant take-up rates > 2000 are excluded from the analysis. There are 5 more 
of these observations when the weights are not adjusted than there are when the NRC (2003) 
adjustments are used. 
 
SENSITIVITY TO SMALL STATE-YEAR CPS SAMPLE SIZES 
 
As described above, the number of eligible individuals is measured with error because of small 
samples of WIC eligible infants in some state-year combinations.22 The econometric effect of 
the measurement error is to increase standard errors (because eligibility is a dependent variable). 
However, the estimates of eligibility also result in take-up rates for infants that are higher than 
100 percent for some state-year combinations. To investigate whether the results are sensitive to 
the inclusion of these observations, the fourth column of tables 3 and 4 presents results when the 
sample omits the 150 observations with take-up rates over 100 percent. The only significant 
changes are for take-up where the income threshold for Medicaid becomes statistically 
insignificant while the effect of TANF implementation becomes significant. 
 
SENSITIVITY TO ASSUMPTIONS USED IN ESTIMATING ELIGIBILITY 
 
As described above a number steps are taken in the calculation of the number of eligible 
individuals. These include adjustments to the CPS weights and assumptions about the 
relationship between eligible infants and eligible pregnant women (e.g., the number of eligible 
infants is multiplied by 0.533 to account for the length of pregnancy and income fluctuations 
around pregnancy). To assess the importance of these assumptions on the results, the models 
were estimated under a number of alternative assumptions. The last column of Tables 3 and 4 
reports the results for the case where the CPS weights are not adjusted for undercounts of infants, 
and the conclusions of the model are not altered by this change. Additional tests were conducted 
for a number of the multipliers (e.g., changing the multiplier for calculating pregnant women 
from 0.533 to the original USDA value of 0.75) with no effect on the results. 
 
SUBGROUP ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 1 shows that during the late 1980s and the 1990s, the number of child recipients grew 
more rapidly than the number of infants or women participants. At the same time, take-up rates 
for children are lower for other groups. To explore whether the policies, economic conditions, 
and demographics have different effects on the different groups of recipients, Table 5 presents 
results separately for women, infants, and children. Although Tables 3 and 4 show the results are 
not sensitive to assumptions used to calculate eligibility, the table begins with children because 
they are a larger group than infants and because the estimates of women are based on the 
(smaller) number of infants. In the Table, Columns 1, 2, and 3 present population participation 
rate, eligibility rate, and take-up rate results, respectively. 
 
The first three columns show the importance of Medicaid eligibility and the TANF program for 
child eligibility and take-up, respectively. Most striking are the large effects of immigration on 
take-up and thus on the population participation rate for children. Before TANF, a one tenth of a 
percentage point increase in new immigrants is estimated to reduce the population participation 
rate by 1.9 percent. After TANF, the same increase in immigrants is estimated to increase this 
same outcome by 2.5 percent [=0.1*(-19.1+43.9)]. 
 
The results for infants and women show no association between immigration (or the TANF 
program itself) and WIC eligibility or participation. Increases in income eligibility for Medicaid 
are negatively related to take-up for both infants and women. In the case of infants, this effect is 
strong enough that the population participation rate is estimated to be negative. However the 
effect of an increase in Medicaid eligibility is not statistically significant over two years at 
conventional values (F-stat 2.43, p-value 0.12). 
 
The negative relationship between the Medicaid eligibility threshold and the population 
participation rate is somewhat surprising. Columns 2 and 3 show that this occurs because the 
estimated reduction in take-up is larger than the estimated increase in eligibility. This means that 
the take-up rate for individuals who were eligible prior to the expansion must fall. This could 
happen if there are omitted variables that are positively correlated with the income thresholds 
and negatively correlated with WIC participation. Possible examples are changes in Medicaid 
coverage of prenatal care services and Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic and Treatment 
benefits. At the same time that income eligibility is rising, coverage of these benefits is growing. 
If these expanded benefits significantly improve birth outcomes and infant health, then some 
mothers may decide to forego infant WIC benefits even though they are income eligible. Currie 
and Gruber (1996) find evidence that the Medicaid expansions improved birth outcomes 
providing support for this idea. 
 
Table 5: Subgroups 
Variabl
es 
Children Infants Women 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Policy Variables 
Medicai
d 
Income 
Cutoff 
0.087**(0
.042) 
0.049**(
0.022) 
0.038(0.0
48) 
-
0.113**(
0.032) 
0.083(0.
051) 
-
0.196**(
0.058) 
-
0.042(0.
037) 
0.083(0.
051) 
-
0.125*(0
.067) 
Medicai
d 
Income 
Cutoff t-
1 
-
0.040(0.0
47) 
0.001(0.
023) 
-
0.050(0.0
51) 
0.050(0.
032) 
-
0.030(0.
046) 
0.083(0.
059) 
0.089**(
0.040) 
-
0.030(0.
046) 
0.122*(0
.066) 
Welfare 
Benefit 
Level 
for 
Family 
of 3 
0.017(0.0
25) 
-
0.009(0.
012) 
0.026(0.0
28) 
0.0008(0
.017) 
-
0.016(0.
018) 
-
0.018(0.
026) 
0.008(0.
019) 
-
0.016(0.
018) 
-
0.010(0.
028) 
TANF 
Program 
-
19.073**(
8.677) 
-
2.745(5.
411) 
-
16.328**
(7.768) 
-
9.953(6.
860) 
-
3.216(8.
509) 
-
6.738(9.
340) 
-
8.422(6.
737) 
-
3.216(8.
509) 
-
5.206(9.
324) 
TANF * 
Percent 
New 
Immigra
nts 
43.925**(
12.694) 
-
1.168(5.
873) 
45.093**
(7.676) 
-
0.594(9.
542) 
-
1.346(10
.120) 
0.753(14
.385) 
5.198(9.
836) 
-
1.346(10
.120) 
6.544(14
.192) 
Economic Variables 
Unempl
oyment 
rate 
-
0.545(0.7
19) 
1.008**(
0.421) 
-
1.553*(0.
843) 
0.902(0.
687) 
2.421**(
0.704) 
-
1.519(1.
011) 
0.271(0.
744) 
2.421**(
0.704) 
-
2.150**(
0.105) 
Unempl
oyment 
rate t-1 
1.446**(0
.712) 
0.421(0.
457) 
1.025(0.8
86) 
-
0.551(0.
668) 
0.526(0.
758) 
-
1.077(1.
036) 
-
0.488(0.
733) 
0.526(0.
758) 
-
1.014(1.
103) 
Unempl
oyment 
rate t-2 
1.612**(0
.639) 
0.004(0.
004) 
1.572**(
0.779) 
1.211**(
0.667) 
-
0.167(0.
722) 
1.378(0.
996) 
1.669**(
0.743) 
-
0.167(0.
722) 
1.836*(1
.070) 
Unempl
oyment 
rate t-3 
2.463**(0
.604) 
0.392(0.
377) 
2.072**(
0.716) 
1.502**(
0.580) 
1.327**(
0.645) 
0.175(0.
893) 
1.913**(
0.633) 
1.327**(
0.645) 
0.587(0.
947) 
Employ
ment 
Growth 
Rate 
-
0.223(0.1
86) 
0.040(0.
133) 
-
0.263(0.2
31) 
-
0.020(0.
195) 
-
0.082(0.
228) 
0.062(0.
303) 
0.018(0.
215) 
-
0.082(0.
228) 
0.100(0.
316) 
Demographic Variables 
Percent 
New 
Immigra
nts 
-
18.909**(
6.254) 
-
1.573(1.
895) 
-
17.336**
(7.144) 
2.515(2.
925) 
0.659(2.
828) 
1.856(4.
541) 
-
0.244(3.
163) 
0.659(2.
828) 
-
0.903(4.
435) 
Notes: The dependent variables for Columns 1, 2, and 3 are the (logarithms of the) Population 
Participation Rate, the Eligibility Rate, and the Take-up Rate, respectively. Sample size is 1165. 
Column 2 is the same for infants and women because both the population and the number 
eligible are based on the number of infants as described in footnote 12. Both columns are 
included in the table for ease of exposition. Table entries are estimated coefficients multiplied by 
100. All models include state effects, year effects, state time trends, and additional demographic 
controls as described in Table 1. Robust standard are in parentheses. * denotes p ≤ 0.1. ** 
denotes p ≤ 0.05. 
Table 6: The Role of WIC Policies – 1987 to 2006 
Variable Recipients/Population Eligibles/Population Recipients/Eligibles 
WIC Policy Variables 
Adjunctive Eligibility  11.709**(3.344) 8.710**(3.066) 2.999(4.495) 
Self-Declare Income  -2.005(2.535) 1.705(2.432) 3.710(3.836) 
Hemoglobin Cutoff  0.732(1.848) 0.095(1.798) 0.637(2.801) 
Non-WIC Policy Variables 
Medicaid Income 
Cutoff  
-0.002(0.003) 0.066**(0.027) -0.068*(0.039) 
Medicaid Income 
Cutoff t-1  
0.034(0.020) -0.019(0.026) 0.053(0.036) 
Welfare Benefit 
Level for Family of 3  
0.022(0.019) 0.013(0.013) 0.010(0.029) 
Major Waiver  -4.237*(2.484) 0.999(2.535) -5.237(3.571) 
TANF Program  -10.164**(5.068) -2.719(5.178) -7.445(4.951) 
TANF * Percent New 
Immigrants  
19.288**(8.072) 7.348(6.860) 11.940(11.178) 
Economic Variables 
Unemployment rate  0.303(0.513) 1.392**(0.533) -1.089(0.773) 
Unemployment rate t-
1  
0.173(0.535) 0.410(0.532) -0.237(0.790) 
Unemployment rate t-
2  
1.099(0.494) 0.259(0.505) 0.841(0.719) 
Unemployment rate t-
3  
1.765**(0.482) 0.302(0.464) 1.463**(0.694) 
Employment Growth 
Rate  
-0.088(0.133) -0.042(0.147) -0.047(0.202) 
Demographic Variables 
Percent New 
Immigrants  
-9.385(6.786) -10.659**(3.936) 1.274(6.642) 
Notes: Sample size is 929. All models include percent of children living in families with no 
father present, percent black, percent Hispanic, percent other race/ethnicity, percent with less 
than HS education, percent with a HS education, state effects, state time trends, and year effects. 
Table entries are coefficient estimates multiplied by 100. Robust standard are in parentheses. * 
denotes p ≤ 0.1. ** denotes p ≤ 0.05. 
THE ROLE OF WIC POLICY 
 
The number of WIC eligible individuals and the number of recipients are also related to WIC 
policies.23 Table 6 reports results with the three WIC policies described above. Because 
information on WIC policies is first available in 1988, the sample period is taken to be 1987 to 
2006 – with the assumption that no changes in policy occurred between 1987 and 1988. 
 
The results in Table 6 show that adjunctive eligibility is positively related to the eligibility rate 
and the population participation rate. None of the WIC variables is statistically related to take-up. 
The remainder of the results are similar to the results from Table 1. The importance of adjunctive 
eligibility for Medicaid recipients is not surprising given the growing role of adjunctive 
eligibility over time. Perhaps more surprising is the lack of a relationship between the ability to 
self-declare income and take-up. This may be explained by relatively little variation in this 
policy as only 10 states were forced to change when the policy was standardized, and there were 
few changes in the policy in other years. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper studies the relationship between measures of WIC eligibility and participation on one 
hand and state policies, economic conditions, and demographic characteristics on the other. The 
analysis separates the population participation rate into the eligibility rate and the take-up rate 
and allows eligibility and take-up to adjust to changes in the environment over time. 
 
Before discussing the results further, it is, however, important to note some caveats. First, WIC 
program rules are only included in a subset of the analysis. It would be ideal to account for 
changes in WIC policy over the full sample period, but these data are not available. If WIC 
policies are correlated with, for example, Medicaid eligibility thresholds, then some of the effects 
attributed to Medicaid are actually due to WIC policies. However, because the data on WIC 
policies indicates that states did not change policies frequently, these effects may be captured by 
the state effects instead. Second, there is evidence that Medicaid and AFDC recipients are 
undercounted in the CPS. To the extent that the undercounted individuals had income above 185 
percent of poverty, this lowers the number of individuals estimated to be eligible which in turn 
lowers the eligibility rate and raises the take-up rate. With these caveats in mind, we turn to some 
key results. 
 
USDA (2006) and Besharov and McCall (2009) have shown that the eligibility rate was 
relatively flat from 1994 to 2003. But this time period misses the Medicaid expansions of the 
1980s, and the present analysis shows eligibility increased between 1989 and 1994 coinciding 
with the Medicaid expansions. Nonetheless, over the full 1983-2006 period, changes in the take-
up rate were significantly larger than changes in the eligibility rate. The likely reason that the 
Medicaid expansions did not result in more dramatic increases in eligibility is that for much of 
the time period the income thresholds for Medicaid remained below the income threshold for 
WIC eligibility. This is particularly true for children. 
 
Because the eligibility rate has remained relatively constant, increases in the population 
participation rate result from increases in take-up among eligible individuals. The results show a 
strong positive association between the number of post-TANF immigrants and WIC participation 
among eligibles. This result is largely driven by increases in the number of child recipients and is 
consistent with newly TANF ineligible immigrants seeking benefits from WIC. 
 
In addition to their differing trends over time, it is important to consider eligibility and take-up 
separately because a number of state characteristics have opposite effects on take-up and 
eligibility. In these cases, analysis of the population participation rate, which combines eligibility 
and take-up into one measure, may show no effect. For example, Bitler, Currie, and Scholz 
(2003) find no evidence of a relationship between unemployment (or poverty) and the population 
participation rate. Similar results are obtained here for the current period effect of 
unemployment, and unreported results of a model that approximates the one used by Bitler, 
Currie, and Scholz (e.g., no state time trends, no lags, including participation rates in other 
programs) also finds no relationship between unemployment and recipients. However, the results 
in this paper show that this “non-effect” is the result of two off-setting effects. 
 
From a policy perspective, not finding an effect when there truly is no effect on either eligibility 
or take-up is different from not finding an effect because a positive eligibility effect and a 
negative take-up effect offset each other. In the case of an increase in unemployment, the 
positive eligibility effect is expected, and knowing that there is a negative take-up effect provides 
the opportunity to better understand why that is and to explore how it may be raised. 
 
One possible reason for the negative effect on take-up is that a significant proportion of the 
newly eligible individuals do not participate. This hypothesis is supported by work by Blank and 
Ruggles (1996) who study eligibility and participation spells in the AFDC and food stamp 
programs and find that the majority of eligibility spells end without participation. They also find 
that most women who will participate in AFDC or Food stamps do it early in their eligibility but 
that, among women who do not participate early, later participation (as opposed to the eligibility 
spell ending without any participation) is positively related to unemployment. This result is 
consistent with the delayed response in take-up to an increase in unemployment found in this 
paper. The policy response depends on the reason for the delay. For example, if individuals lack 
information about eligibility then a public information campaign may improve take-up. 
 
The conclusions of the paper point to a number of avenues for future research. First, a better 
understanding of undercounting of Medicaid recipients in the CPS would improve estimates of 
the role of adjunctive eligibility. The issue is more complicated than simply adjusting the 
aggregate number of Medicaid recipients because the adjustment must be made separately for 
individuals living in families with incomes below and above 185 percent of poverty in order to 
accurately count the individuals who are not income eligible but receive WIC due to adjunctive 
eligibility. Second, take-up is shown to be the driver behind increases in the number of 
recipients, and although a number of the variables significantly predict increases in take-up, 
much of the increase is explained by the year effects. Future research could productively be 
devoted to attempting to further understand the reasons for increased take-up. 
 
Appendix Table 1: Data Sources 
Variable  Source 
Dependent Variables 
Recipients  USDA 
WIC Policy Variables 
Self-Declare Income  Survey of WIC Program Characteristics, 
Various Years 
Adjunctive Medicaid Elig.  Survey of WIC Program Characteristics, 
Various Years 
AFDC/TANF Policy Variables 
Benefit for Family of 3  The Green Book & Data Provided by Rebecca 
Blank 
Indicator for major waiver to AFDC rules  Council of Economic Advisors (1999) 
Indicator for TANF implementation  Crouse (1999) 
Medicaid Policy Variables 
Income Eligibility Level for Pregnant Women  National Governor’s Association & Kaiser 
Family Foundation 
Economic Variables 
Unemployment rate  Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Employment Growth Rate  Current Population Survey 
Demographic Variables 
Number of New Immigrants  Survey of Immigration Statistics 
Percent of Kids with No Dad  Current Population Survey 
Percent Black  Current Population Survey 
Percent Hispanic  Current Population Survey 
Percent Other Race  Current Population Survey 
Percent < HS  Current Population Survey 
Percent with HS  Current Population Survey 
 
Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Unweighted Weighted 
Variable Mean SD Mean SE 
Dependent Variables 
Recipients/1000 
population  
230.10  85.82  225.01  4.46 
Eligible 
People/1000 
Population  
519.58  113.88  519.13  3.77 
Recipients/Eligible 
People  
450.91  158.98  436.59  7.59 
Women 
Recipients/1000 
Women  
243.36  111.78  240.89  5.14 
Eligible 
Women/1000 
Women  
511.79  139.18  508.56  4.44 
Women 496.89  238.72  484.28  9.22 
Recip./1000 
Eligible Women  
Infant 
Recipents/1000 
Infants  
391.06  161.80  389.72  6.23 
Eligible 
Infants/1000 
Infants  
605.38  164.63  601.56  5.25 
Infant Recip./1000 
Eligible Infants  
675.61  293.83  665.83  10.00 
Child 
Recipents/1000 
Children  
188.86  74.13  179.57  4.18 
Eligible 
Children/1000 
Children  
500.23  109.19  501.47  3.55 
Child Recip./1000 
Eligible Children  
386.79  154.28  362.26  7.66 
Policy Variables 
Medicaid 
Income Threshold  138.45  58.04  146.31  2.59 
AFDC/TANF 
Benefit for Family 
of 3  
542.69  271.72  555.88  15.90 
Major Waiver 
Indicator  
0.06  0.22  0.08  0.02 
TANF Program 
Indicator 
 0.39  0.48  0.41  0.02 
TANF * Percent 
New Immigrants1  
-0.05  0.12  -0.005  0.01 
WIC 
Self-Declare 
Income  
0.13  0.33  0.12  0.01 
Adjunctive 
Medicaid Elig.  
0.95  0.22  0.96  0.01 
First Trimester 
Hemoglobin  
11.32  0.48  11.36  0.03 
Economic 
Variables 
    
Unemployment 
rate  
5.90  2.15  6.08  0.08 
Employment 
Growth Rate  
1.66  3.53  1.65  0.1 
Demographic Variables 
Percent New 
Immigrants  
0.22  0.22  0.35  0.02 
Percent Kids No 
Dad  
23.84  8.19  24.49  0.20 
Percent Black  10.88  12.02  12.33  0.28 
Percent Hispanic  6.11  8.44  11.27  0.65 
Percent Other 
Race/Ethnicity  
5.10  10.06  4.67  0.24 
Percent < HS  18.35  7.22  19.17  0.22 
Percent with HS  36.74  4.68  35.60  0.28 
Number of observations is 1165 except for the WIC policy variables where the number of 
observations is 929. Notes: 1Percent New Immigrants * TANF is evaluated at the (weighted) 
mean of Percent New Immigrants. 
Notes 
1 Joyce et al. (2005) and Joyce et al. (2008) suggest more limited effects of WIC. 
2 For more information on the WIC program, see Oliveira et al. (2002). 
3 A few studies (e.g., Swann 2007 and Tiehen and Jacknowitz 2008) go beyond the participation 
decision itself to study the timing of initial WIC participation by pregnant women. 
4 The numbers of categorically eligible individuals (e.g., infants) are taken as given. 
5 As discussed below, data limitations preclude the inclusion of WIC policies in all of the 
analysis. 
6 Blank and Ruggles (1996) study eligibility and participation spells for AFDC and food stamps. 
7 Lags were considered for all of the policy variables. Multicollinearity became an issue with the 
full set of lags – particularly with presence of state time trends. Lagged Medicaid eligibility was 
retained in the model because of the focus on the Medicaid expansions. 
8 Using tests outlined in Wooldridge (2002), pooled OLS and random effects models were 
considered and rejected in favor of fixed effects. 
9 This approach has also been used to study welfare caseloads (Blank 2001, Council of 
Economic Advisors 1997 and 1999, and Ziliak, et al. 2000), food stamp caseloads (Currie and 
Grogger 2001), foster care caseloads (Swann and Sylvester 2006), and child maltreatment 
(Paxson and Waldfogel 2002). 
10 It is generally agreed that the nutritional risk criteria is not a binding constraint so that the de 
facto requirements are categorical and income eligibility. 
11 Besharov and McCall (2009) consider additional adjustments that further increase the number 
of eligible individuals. 
12 The number of eligible infants is estimating using the following steps: 1) Use the CPS to 
estimate the baseline number of infants; 2) Use the adjustment factors from NRC (2003) to 
adjust the CPS weights for undercounts of infants. Adjustments are made separately by age and 
race. 3) Deem infants eligible if family income is less than 185% of poverty or they are enrolled 
in Medicaid, AFDC/TANF, or food stamps; and 4) Make an adjustment to account for the fact 
that CPS collects information about annual income while WIC eligibility is based on monthly 
income. This adjustment takes the form of a multiplier equal to 1.28. To estimate the number of 
eligible children, the process is the same except that the income multiplier is 1.10. To calculate 
the number of pregnant women, the number of eligible infants is multiplied by 0.533 to account 
for the length of pregnancy and changes in income during pregnancy that are not captured by the 
CPS’s annual measure of income. Similar adjustments using multipliers are made to estimate the 
number of postpartum women who do and do not breastfeed. As with pregnant women, these 
estimates are based on the number of eligible infants. See NRC (2003) and Besharov and McCall 
(2009) for more details. When constructing the estimation sample, 15 observations are excluded 
because the infant take-up rate is estimated to be greater than 200 percent. 
13 On average there are 22 eligible infants and 96 eligible children. 
14 One caveat is that the CPS undercounts the number of individuals who receive Medicaid. To 
the extent the uncounted individuals are not income eligible, the eligibility rate is underestimated 
and the take-up rate is over-estimated. Wheaton (2007) provides estimates of Medicaid 
underreporting in the CPS for the period 1995-2005. Incorporating these annual estimates into 
the analysis did not qualitatively change the results. To properly account for underreporting, it 
would be necessary know the extent of undercounting among recipients with incomes greater 
than 185% of poverty – ideally on an annual basis for each state. 
15 The small number of individuals estimated to be adjunctively eligible during this period 
means that the results are not sensitive to this assumption. 
16 The conclusions are not qualitatively affected by including or omitting a lag. 
17 For a more detailed discussion of the Medicaid expansions see Gruber (2002), Yelowitz 
(1995), or Currie and Gruber (1996). 
18 Changes to income eligibility for Medicaid continued beyond the 1980s, and these later 
changes are incorporated into the analysis. 
19 If SCHIP funds are used to expand Medicaid eligibility, the SCHIP funded threshold is used 
in the analysis. 
20 States had, and continue to have, discretion over whether recipients of other programs (e.g. 
the school lunch program) are adjunctively eligible for WIC. Unfortunately, data on these 
policies are only available for a few years of the WIC Program and Participant Characteristics 
surveys. 
21 Estimates from a fixed effect model with a lagged dependent variable are not consistent; 
however, the effect is likely to be small when the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 
not close to 1 or 100 in this case since the tables report coefficients multiplied by 100 
(Wooldridge 2002). 
22 Sample sizes are not as much of a problem for children because of the larger age range. 
23 Brien and Swann (2001), Bitler, Currie, and Scholz (2003), and Bitler and Currie (2005) show 
that participation is related to WIC policies. 
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